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1. Introduction
Menno Reijven in his paper entitled “Institutional and Institutionalized Fallacies: Diversifying
Pragma-Dialectical Fallacy Judgments” positions himself in the debate about fallacy
judgments, esp. in the situation where contextual issues play a role. His proposal is a very
interesting one, because it seems to solve the problem that is at the core of this debate. By
adding an extra dimension to fallacy judgments, Reijven is differentiating the answer to the
question “Is this a good argument?” into four possibilities. Instead of the traditional “yes” and
“no”, the evaluator of argumentative discourse can choose between the following responses
(my rephrasing):
(1) yes, this move is reasonable from a purely argumentative point of view, and it also
makes sense within the particular institutional context in which it is performed
(2) yes, this move is reasonable from a purely argumentative point of view, but it does not
make sense within the particular institutional context in which it is performed
(3) no, this move is fallacious if you judge it from a purely argumentative point of view,
but things always go this way within this particular institutional context
(4) no, this move is fallacious if you judge it from a purely argumentative point of view,
and it does not make much sense within the particular institutional context in which it
is performed either
In diversifying pragma-dialectical fallacy judgments in this way, Reijven explicitly follows up
on an elucidation of the consequences of the pragma-dialectical stance on the matter that
Francisca Snoeck Henkemans and myself presented in our paper Reasonableness in context:
Taking into account institutional conventions in the pragma-dialectical evaluation of
argumentative discourse (Snoeck Henkemans & Wagemans, 2015). As we observed, certain
argumentative moves performed in institutionalized contexts are fallacious when assessed
from a pragma-dialectical perspective but seem perfectly reasonable or even institutionally
required when assessed from the perspective of the conventions or rules applicable in the
communicative domain at hand. Reijven’s proposal of diversifying fallacy judgments can be
seen as an attempt to avoid the undesirable consequences of that observation: if we don’t want
institutions to be promoting fallacious moves, we should differentiate our fallacy judgment.
In my view, Reijven has been very inventive and precise in working out this
diversification. His solution of adding an extra dimension to fallacy judgments opens up new
pathways of dealing with the tension between general and context-specific standards for
assessing argumentative discourse (i.e., between van Eemeren and Grootendorst’s approach
and Walton’s approach). But it also invites a reconsideration of an even more fundamental
issue, namely the question of what makes an argumentative move fallacious in the first place.
Where do our standards for the reasonableness of argumentative discourse come from? Do
they come from some kind of theoretical ideal that is generally applicable, or do we derive

them from institutionalized practices? In his diversification proposal, Reijven does not make a
choice between these two sources of normativity. Instead, he combines them, thus providing
the analyst with four instead of two different fallacy judgments to choose from. It’s an elegant
solution for a difficult problem, for sure. But could it also be an example of throwing out the
normative baby with the combinational bathwater?
In my comments, I shall first explain my views on the consequences of choosing a
pragma-dialectical framework for evaluating institutionalized discourse, mainly on the basis
of Snoeck Henkemans and Wagemans (2015). Then, I will reflect upon the more fundamental
issue of where the standards for making fallacy judgments (should) come from, leading to the
tentative conclusion that van Eemeren and Grootendorst’s generalistic approach generates the
same results as Walton’s contextual approach. The comments give rise to two questions for
Reijven, which can be found at the end of the respective sections.
2. Consequences of choosing a pragma-dialectical perspective
In assessing argumentative discourse from a pragma-dialectical perspective, the analyst
makes use of the norms expressed in the rules of a critical discussion. These rules, as
indicated by the following quote in Snoeck Henkemans and Wagemans (2015, pp. 13501351), are deemed generally applicable:
Although we agree […] that fallacy judgments are in the end always contextual
judgments that depend on the specific circumstances of situated argumentative acting,
we do not agree that the norms underlying these judgments are context-dependent. In
our view, the norms expressed in the rules for critical discussion are general – who
knows even universal – norms for sound argumentation that are not limited to one
particular type of argumentative activity. (van Eemeren & Houtlosser, 2007, p. 64)
One of the consequences of this stance is that the evaluator works with context-independent
norms for judging the reasonableness of the discourse and can never opt for making an
exception to the rules in cases where a particular argumentative move is prescribed by
institutional conventions. Examples of the latter quoted in Snoeck Henkemans and Wagemans
(2015, p. 1351) are time limits in legal discourse and institutional burden of proof in medical
consultation about treatment options:
According to Feteris, ‘to safeguard legal rights, there are time limits within which an
appeal must be taken. Otherwise the party who has won the trial can never be sure
about his rights’ (1990, p. 113). The existence of this time limit is not completely in
accordance with the pragma-dialectical ‘freedom rule,’ according to which discussants
have the unconditional right to put forward a standpoint or call into question the
standpoint of the other party in the discussion (van Eemeren & Grootendorst, 2004,
pp. 136, 190-191). […] Another example is the medical consultation, where,
according to Snoeck Henkemans and Mohammed, an institutional burden of proof is
imposed on doctors ‘to justify treatment options without patients having to express
any disagreement about these options.’ (2012, p. 30, note 3)
This leaves us with the observation that certain moves performed in institutionalized contexts
should be judged as fallacious when assessed from a pragma-dialectical perspective, while
they seem perfectly reasonable in the sense that they promote the institutional goal of the
communicative activity in which they are put forward.

But why would this be a problem? In some cases, the pragma-dialectical evaluation
yields a negative result and the institutional evaluation a positive one. So what? After all, the
assumed aim of a critical discussion is to resolve a difference of opinion on the merits, and the
rules for a critical discussion promote (but do not guarantee) the accomplishment of that aim,
while the assumed aim of an institutionalized discussion is to promote the accomplishment of
the institutional aim of the domain in which the communicative activity takes place. To a
certain extent, both aims run parallel, which means that complying with institutional norms
does not necessarily mean violating argumentative norms (e.g., in promoting justice or health,
the arguer does not necessarily commit fallacies). In some cases, however, moves that comply
with institutional norms do not comply with pragma-dialectical ones and should therefore be
judged fallacious. As explained in Snoeck Henkemans and Wagemans (2015), this is a
consequence of the theoretical assumptions made in the kernel of the pragma-dialectical
theory. In the end, the discourse is evaluated on the basis of the rules for a critical discussion,
which are generally applicable, and not on the basis of institutional rules, which are contextdependent.
These reflections give rise to my first question for Reijven, namely why he considers
it an undesirable consequence of the pragma-dialectical approach that certain moves are
judged fallacious while they are reasonable from an institutional point of view. Why is the
fact that an assessment of an argumentative move yields two different answers when viewed
from two different perspectives problematic in the first place?
3. The issue behind the issue
As Reijven notes, the difference between Walton’s approach to fallacies and van Eemeren and
Grootendorst’s one lies in how they take into account the dialectical context in which the
argumentative move is performed:
Thus, for Walton (1998), a fallacy is not a move which hinders critical testing of a
standpoint, as presumed by pragma-dialecticians (Van Eemeren, 2018), but a move
that hinders specific goal of the interaction one is engaged in. (p. 2)
As is indicated by the name of their respective approaches, both Walton’s new dialectic and
van Eemeren and Grootendorst’s pragma-dialectics conceptualize argumentative discourse as
a discussion. But the difference between them is not only a matter of how they theorize about
argumentation, but also, and maybe more importantly, a matter of to what end the insights and
models they have developed are used. To explain this in more detail, I now quote a summary
of their ideas about ‘dialogue types’ and ‘institutionalized communicative practices’
(Wagemans, forthcoming).
Dialectical approaches study argumentation from the perspective of a theoretical
framework that is premised on the idea of two parties having a discussion that
minimally involves an exchange of arguments for and against a particular point of
view. An influential taxonomy of such discussions is the one by Walton and Krabbe
(1995), who distinguish between six different ‘dialogue types’. According to them, a
‘persuasion dialogue’ is primarily aimed at resolving or clarifying an issue, an ‘inquiry
dialogue’ at proving or disproving a hypothesis, a ‘negotiation dialogue’ at reaching a
reasonable settlement both participants can live with, an ‘information-seeking
dialogue’ at exchanging information, a ‘deliberation dialogue’ at deciding the best
available course of action, and an ‘eristic dialogue’ at revealing a deeper basis of
conflict.

The concept of ‘dialogue type’ mainly serves the purpose of evaluating the
arguments put forward by the participants. For the outcome of such evaluation it
makes quite a difference whether an argument is part of, for instance, an inquiry
dialogue, which is aimed at determining the acceptability of a particular point of view,
or of a negotiation dialogue, which is aimed at making a deal that optimally serves the
interests of the parties involved. The evaluation, therefore, takes place by first
identifying the dialogue type within which the argument under scrutiny has been put
forward and by subsequently checking whether that particular argument contributes to
accomplishing the specific goal that is characteristic of that type. If it does, the
argument is evaluated as a good argument, but if it blocks achieving that goal, it is
judged as fallacious.
Another example of a dialectical conceptualisation of argumentative discourse
is van Eemeren’s (2010) theory about conventionalised argumentative practices that
links specific genres of communicative activity to the institutional goals of the
domains in which they are implemented. The genre of ‘adjudication’ is instrumental in
the domain of legal communication, that of ‘deliberation’ in political communication,
‘mediation’ in problem-solving communication, ‘negotiation’ in diplomatic
communication, ‘consultation’ in medical communication, ‘disputation’ in scholarly
communication, ‘promotion’ in commercial communication, and ‘communion’ in
interpersonal communication.
Different from the concept of dialogue types, which is used for evaluative
purposes, that of communicative activity types is primarily used for providing a
contextualised analysis of concrete speech events as tokens of particular
communicative activity types that implement one or more of the genres just
mentioned. The subsequent evaluation of the contributions of the discussants to this
speech event takes place by checking whether they comply with a set of rules specified
in the ‘ideal model of a critical discussion’, which embodies a critical rationalist view
on reasonableness and is generally deemed applicable to all types of argumentative
activity.
Of all the different genres of communicative activity mentioned, ‘disputation’ is most closely
related to the ‘inquiry dialogue’. And it does not come as a surprise that both types of
discussion resemble a ‘critical discussion.’ The ideal model of a critical discussion can be
interpreted, after all, as an idealization of philosophical or scientific discussions aimed at
finding the truth.
Now what happens when argumentative discourse situated in a non-philosophical or
non-scientific context is evaluated from a pragma-dialectical perspective? The straightforward
answer to this question is the following: what happens is that the rules for a critical
discussion, in which a philosophical or scientific ideal of reasonableness is embodied, are
projected onto a discourse that belongs to a different institutional context and that is put forth
with a different aim in mind (e.g., promoting justice or health). What is then judged is the
extent to which the discourse can be said to promote (or, at least, not hinder) the
accomplishment of the purely argumentative aim of resolving a difference of opinion on the
merits.
But it is not for nothing that institutions have rules that might deviate to a greater or
lesser extent from the rules for a critical discussion. In a philosophical or scientific discussion,
after which a critical discussion is modeled, participants are allowed to open the discussion
over and over again. This promotes the accomplishment of the institutional aim of the
practice, which is to come closer to the truth by critically testing the acceptability of a
particular point of view. But why is it that in legal discussions, you only have six weeks to

come up with a reply, and every opinion of the other party you do not refute is taken as a
concession? Why can’t you start over again from the beginning? Why can’t you go to same
court with the same case after the judge has taken an unfavorable decision – the ne bis in idem
principle? Because this runs against the idea that the procedure should provide legal security.
Unlike in the fields of philosophy and science, where discussions can continue forever, in the
field of law a decision has to be taken and discussions can only be reopened if there is new
evidence.
Now the issue behind the issue is the following. When taking a pragma-dialectical
perspective, we only label the type of reasonableness embodied in philosophical and scientific
discussions as ‘argumentative’. But what if we also label the types of reasonableness
embodied in other institutionalized practices as ‘argumentative’? What if we stop taking the
genre of ‘disputation’ as the paragon of argumentatively reasonable behavior?
Well, if we do so, the question of what happens when argumentative discourse in nonphilosophical or non-scientific contexts is evaluated from a pragma-dialectical perspective,
should be answered in a slightly different way. For in this case, such evaluation does not
inform the analyst about the extent to which the discourse can be said to promote (or, at least,
not hinder) the accomplishment of the purely argumentative aim of resolving a difference of
opinion on the merits but yields a comparative verdict. When every type of institutionalized
reasonableness can be called ‘argumentative’, deviating from the norms for a critical
discussion means deviating from norms that govern a different genre than the one under
scrutiny. As a consequence, if a specific move is judged as fallacious, that move does not
promote another institution’s aim. Or, in Walton’s terms, there has been a ‘dialogue shift’.
This brings me to my second question for Reijven, namely whether he agrees that
when the theoretical notion of a ‘critical discussion’ can be equated with the empirical notion
of an ‘inquiry dialogue’ or ‘disputation’, the difference between Walton’s and van Eemeren
and Grootendorst’s approaches is reduced to a mere difference in terminology.
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